The aim of this paper is to analyse work incentive effects from a recent change in the Australian tax and transfer system on sole parents. Two approaches are used in the analysis: microsimulation and quasi-experimental evaluation. Both approaches examine the effects on the probability of employment and average working hours. The results from both approaches show that the combined changes introduced in July 2000-involving reduced withdrawal rates, changed family payments and lower income tax rates-have increased labour supply for sole parents to a small extent. The results from microsimulation are slightly smaller than those estimated from a quasi-experimental approach using matching techniques to control for alternative influences. In addition, using microsimulation, the separate effects of the components can be estimated. It was found that reduced benefit withdrawal rates, a reduction in the withdrawal rates and abolition of the "sudden death" for family payments, and lower income tax rates all increased labour supply. However, the replacement of tax rebates with additional non-income-tested family payments is estimated to have a negative effect on labour supply.
Introduction
This paper compares the predicted effects of a recent policy change on labour supply using two different approaches. For a subgroup of sole parents, the effect of this change on sole parents' labour supply is analysed using two different approaches: tax policy microsimulation and quasi-experimental evaluation. This provides us with the opportunity to compare the predictions from microsimulation with an evaluation based on pre-and post-reform data. This comparison is worthwhile, given the importance of the results for informed policy-making. A strength of microsimulation analysis is that it can be used ex ante, at the policy development stage. This could be useful for policy makers, especially if they can feel confident that the results are a valuable addition to information from other sources. Similar outcomes from these two newly developed and rigorous approaches would reinforce the estimated effect of a reform and build confidence in behavioural microsimulation modelling and quasi-experimental evaluation.
A few papers (for example, Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; have made this type of comparison using different evaluation approaches. This paper is different from the studies above, in that it uses a difference-in-difference approach in the ex-post evaluation whereas Blundell and Hoynes (2004) did a direct before-after comparison (which does not account for the potential effect of other changes occurring at the same time). also employed a difference-in-difference approach, but this was implemented using regression models. In this paper, propensity score matching estimators were employed, which are less dependent on functional form. In Australia, Doiron (2004) compares the outcome of her quasi-experimental evaluation of a policy change for sole parents in the late 1980s with similar (but not exactly the same) changes reported in separate simulation studies. The advantage of this study compared to Doiron (2004) is that the microsimulation results to which the quasi-experimental evaluation outcomes are compared are specifically generated with this comparison in mind.
However, one should be cautious in interpreting the comparison results because the magnitudes of the estimated effects from the two approaches are not expected to be the same. There are several reasons for differences. First, microsimulation is a partial equilibrium approach not accounting for the potential effect of policy changes on other parts of the economy. For example, labour demand is not taken into account, and although quasi-experimental evaluation is not a general equilibrium approach either, the estimated effects from this approach incorporate labour demand effects. Second, while estimated effects from quasi-experimental evaluation depend on the time-frame used, the results from microsimulation are supposed to reflect the long-run effect. Third, when a policy is actually introduced, other changes affecting labour supply may occur at the same time. While the effects of these changes would be automatically reflected in the quasi-experimental evaluation results, they would not be reflected by the microsimulation results if these changes are not simulated explicitly. Finally, it can be difficult to find the right data to do an appropriate quasi-experimental evaluation. In this paper to facilitate the comparison, we run specific microsimulation analyses to replicate the change measured by the evaluation approach.
The reform examined here concerns a recent change in the Australian tax and social security transfer arrangements, the introduction of the Australian New Tax System (ANTS) in July 2000. The specific components of the reform are a decrease in marginal income tax rates and an increase in the tax-free threshold; a decrease in the withdrawal rate from 50 to 40 per cent for Parenting Payment Single; 1 and the introduction of Family Tax Benefit (FTB) to replace a range of family assistance schemes existing before ANTS. Along with the latter several changes were introduced, such as an increase in the withdrawal-free family income level; replacement of the "sudden death" income test of minimum level family payments by a 30 per cent withdrawal rate; and a reduction of the 50 per cent withdrawal rate of the maximum level family payments to 30 per cent. Appendix A contains a set of tables summarising these changes introduced in ANTS.
The types of reform discussed in this paper are relevant to other countries, which have similar components of social security, such as the U.K. and other European countries with a universal social assistance scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two gives a brief discussion of the effect of the policy change on net incomes and marginal effective tax rates across a range of labour 1 Parenting Payment Single is the main income-tested income support payment for sole parents, for which all sole parents with children under the age of 16 are eligible. Sole parents with older children receive other less generous income support payments.
supply levels for some hypothetical single parents. Simulations of the complete ANTS package and some of its components are presented for all sole parents in Section three. A quasi-experimental evaluation of the components of the ANTS package that are specific for sole parents is discussed in Section four, first introducing the methodology followed by the results. Section five compares the outcomes from Section four with the corresponding microsimulation outcomes using MITTS. Section six concludes.
Changed Incentives Resulting from ANTS
This section discusses the financial incentives to work resulting from the policy changes that are part of ANTS. The effect of reductions in the marginal income tax rates (including the increase in the tax-free threshold) on labour supply is ambiguous because the reductions increase the after tax wage rate of employed people. The increase in the after-tax wage rates implies that workers can take home more income if their working hours remain unchanged, which will reduce labour supply (the income effect). However, the increase in the after-tax wage rates raises the opportunity cost of leisure and makes employment more attractive (the substitution effect). The income and substitution effects operate in opposite directions.
Therefore, the net effect on labour supply is an empirical issue.
Similarly, the effect of a change in income support benefit thresholds and withdrawal rates results in income and substitution effects working in opposite directions. These changes might cause additional people to be eligible for payments. The labour supply effects for these newly eligible people may be different from those who are eligible under both the old and new policy. That is, while an increase in the withdrawal-free threshold and a decrease in the withdrawal rate in theory may have an ambiguous effect on the labour supply of payment recipients (and probably has a positive effect on individuals who are currently out of the labour force); the effect on the newly eligible individuals is unambiguously negative. This is because the newly eligible families are subject to an additional withdrawal rate, resulting in a higher marginal effective tax rate, while at the same time experiencing a higher level of income at the same labour supply level, both of which have a negative effect on labour supply. It depends on the size of the different groups and the size of the effects, whether the overall effect is positive or negative.
To obtain an idea of the proportion of sole parents in Australia, who experienced a decrease or an increase in the marginal effective tax rates (METRs) at fixed labour supply, Overall, the policy change increases the proportion of sole parents on METRs between 0 and 40 per cent, and to a larger extent, it increases the proportion between 50 and 70 per cent. The increase in the latter group is largely due to the substantial decrease in the group with a METR of over 70 per cent.
Because in general, the new policy is expected to reduce the previously very high
METRs -in particular for those previously facing high METRs who were out of the labour force or at low labour supply levels-the overall incentive effect of the new policy is expected to be positive. This assumes that the negative effect on labour supply through the increase of some individuals' METRs is relatively minor. Gregory, Klug and Thapa (2003) also analysed the July 2000 policy changes using the Longitudinal Data Survey (LDS), an administrative data set on social security recipients.
They focussed on sole parents who receive income support. Similar to them, we conclude that METRs are still high for some income ranges; however, we believe they have fallen considerably for large ranges of income. Even if these are not incomes at which the majority of sole parents are located, they could improve incentives by making alternatives to non-participation more attractive. Although, we agree that the income tax changes are unlikely to have had a large effect on incentives, by including sole parents in our analysis, who are not on income support and as a result are likely to benefit more from the income tax changes and some of the family payment changes, we believe that these changes are more relevant than they appear to be from Gregory, Klug and Thapa.
A few main components of the ANTS package were important in causing these METR changes. Taking away the accumulation of different payments and rebates related to the presence of dependent children in the household, and replacing it by one payment with one reduced withdrawal rate, decreased METRs for middle-income sole parents. The reduction in the Parenting Payment withdrawal rate for sole parents by 10 per cent was another factor, which lowered METRs. On the other hand, these wider withdrawal ranges resulted in an increase in METRs for those, who are at the high end of the income range and were not eligible for the payment before the introduction of the ANTS package.
The effect of the reform is illustrated in two figures in Appendix B, where changes in net incomes and METRs are presented for a hypothetical sole parent. With the introduction of ANTS, net incomes increase at all labour supply levels for all sole parents. In the larger part of the hours range, METRs are reduced, but for a limited range of incomes there is an increase. Sole parents with higher wage rates who are working close to full time hours tend to have the largest increase in net income when comparing the pre-and post-reform situation. This could make it more attractive for sole parents on higher wage rates to work full-time after the reform.
Predicted labour supply effects using microsimulation
The results in this section are obtained using the microsimulation approach to evaluate the effects of the ANTS policy changes on sole parents' labour supply. 
The MITTS model
MITTS calculates net incomes for each household in the relevant year of the Survey of Income and Housing Cost based on the wage rates of individuals (either observed in the data or imputed, using the estimated wage equations as described in Kalb and Scutella (2002) ), other income, and some individual and household characteristics. The net incomes can be calculated imposing different tax and transfer systems, allowing hypothetical and real policy changes to be analysed.
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The estimation of the expected labour supply changes is based on the labour supply model estimated in Kalb (2002) . The estimated parameters used here are an update of the model used in Duncan and Harris (2002) , which follows the discrete choice approach taken by Van Soest (1995) and .
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Given the aim of simulating policy changes with regard to the tax and transfer system and assessing its effect on labour supply, priority is given to incorporating all possible detail on taxes and transfers. an optimal hours level that differs from the discretised value observed before the reform, otherwise the draw is accepted. 5 The accepted drawings are then used to determine the optimal hours level after the policy change. A total of 100 'successful draws' (that is, drawings which generate the observed hours as the optimal value under the base system for the individual) are produced. 6 This results in a probability distribution over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer structure. Finally, it should be noted that MITTS is a partial-equilibrium supply-side model and thus the behavioural changes do not account for any changes in labour demand. If individuals prefer to work more hours after a reform then they can only do so if there is a demand for their labour. In MITTS it is assumed that all additional labour supply is met by a sufficient demand for labour or effectively that the demand for labour is perfectly elastic.
Effect of the total ANTS package
The aggregated labour supply responses to the introduction of ANTS are presented in the first column of Table 2 . The policy change leads to a net increase in the expected labour supply for single parents. Although the policy reform causes some people to reduce their 4 Labour supply is kept constant for some groups who are expected to differ in their responses (that is, be less responsive) compared to the average working-age individual. These groups are the self-employed, those on disability payments, full-time students and people over 65 years of age. 5 The optimal hours level is the labour supply where the utility of an individual is at a maximum. 6 MITTS allows the user to vary the number of successful random draws that are retained as well as the number of attempts to find those successes. 7 See Creedy and Kalb (2005) for a detailed description of the estimation, specification and simulation in behavioural microsimulation modelling.
labour supply, this is outweighed by those who would like to increase their labour supply.
The results also show that among those who already worked under the old system, the proportion who increases working hours dominates those who reduce working hours, producing an overall increase in average working hours. Allowing for the uncertainty in estimated labour supply parameters, we find that the estimated effects are significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level.
8 In addition to the forward simulation results in the first column, using 1999/2000 SIHC data, for which the January 2000 tax and transfer system is used as the base (or pre-reform) system and ANTS as the post-reform system, a backward simulation is carried out. This simulation uses 2000/2001 SIHC data, where we reverse the policy changes (see Appendix C for summary statistics on SIHC 1999 SIHC /2000 SIHC , 2000 SIHC /2001 . That is, in the backward simulation, ANTS is used as the pre-reform system and the January 2000 system as the post-reform system. The backward simulation serves a confirmation purpose only. Given the small number of sole parents in the SIHC, observed labour supply in the two years cannot be directly compared. We expect the two simulations to produce opposite effects of a similar size and this is indeed the case. When the policy changes were reversed, the simulated labour supply falls.
These results confirm the finding by Kalb, Kew and Scutella (2005) , an earlier study based on the SIHC 1997/1998, that ANTS has a positive effect on labour supply of sole parents.
However, the magnitudes of the simulated effects are somewhat different, probably due to the use of different data. 9 We now find a somewhat larger effect on sole parents' working hours than in the earlier study. The proportion of "workers working more" has increased, in particular. This is likely to have been caused, at least partly, through the larger percentage of sole parents, who are working for wages or salaries in SIHC 1999 /2000 compared to SIHC 1997 /1998 . This larger group of labour market participants provides a larger base of workers who may increase their hours worked.
The results in Table 2 appear to be consistent with the budget constraints for sole parents, outlined in Section 2, where it was found that the incentive to enter the labour force for non-participating sole parents, who are mostly on low wages, might be smaller than the incentive for part-time workers on medium wages to increase their labour supply. It also appears that the substitution effect might dominate the income effect, with more workers increasing labour supply than decreasing labour supply.
Impacts of separate policy components
The effect of separate components is evaluated by taking out one component from the complete ANTS package and examining the effect of putting this component back into the system. 10 The simulations ignore any interactions between different policy components.
Four separate components are separately examined: the changes in tax rates and tax thresholds, the decrease in pension withdrawal rate, the introduction of Family Tax Benefit part A (FTB-A), and the introduction of Family Tax Benefit part B (FTB-B). For details on the changes, see Appendix A. Table 3 presents a summary of the labour supply responses for the separate components. As mentioned earlier, theoretically the net effect on labour supply of the increase in tax thresholds and the decrease in the tax rates is ambiguous. The simulation results show that this change increases labour supply for sole parents. Not only are more single parents expected to want to work under the new tax system than under the old system, but in addition, among those who were working in the old system, the group expected to increase labour supply is larger than the group expected to decrease their working hours. As a result, the average number of working hours increases. All estimated effects are significant, except for the percentage of sole parents moving from work to non-work when only the income tax changes are applied. (0.69, 1.15) (0.38, 0.83) (0.78, 1.92) (-3.00, -1.97 ) Note (a): This excludes the self-employed for whom no hours of work are observed. Before the reform, the percentage of all workers in the sole parent population in 1999/2000 is 51.9 per cent.
The change in benefit withdrawal rate from 50 to 40 per cent is predicted to increase the participation rate by about 2 per cent and the average labour supply is predicted to increase by about half an hour. It appears that these results are driven by an increase in participation rather than by increased working hours of those who were already working under the base system. Indeed, among those who were working under the base system, the proportion of single parents who would like to reduce the working hours is greater than the proportion who would like to increase working hours. This is in contrast to the income tax reform, which seems to encourage additional labour supply of a wider range of single parents who already are in the labour force and work a substantial number of hours, whereas the withdrawal rate reduction encourages non-participants and sole parents working few hours to increase labour supply. Nevertheless, the increase in participation is sufficient to flow on to a net increase in average working hours.
FTB-A replaced three former family related payments: Family Allowance (including Minimum Family Allowance), Family Tax Payment A and Family Tax Assistance A.
Under FTB-A, payment rates and income test thresholds were increased by more than the inflation rate, with the payment reduced out at a more gradual rate than in the old system. This change is expected to have a relatively large positive labour supply effect: over 2 percentage points more sole parents are expected to work after the introduction of FTB-A, and average working hours are expected to increase by 1.4 hours.
This component of family payments is linked with FTB-B, a combination and simplification of six former forms of assistance, three social security payments and three forms of assistance available through the taxation system, which were available to singleincome earner families (including sole parent families) (see Appendix A, Table A.5). Table   3 shows that the effects of introducing FTB-B are the reverse of FTB-A. The negative effect for sole parents is likely to have been caused by the replacement of two tax rebates (which were only received if sufficient tax is paid in a year) with fortnightly payments received by all sole parents. As a result being out of the labour force has become more attractive. Similar to the effect of FTB-A, the estimated impact is substantial. With the introduction of FTB-B, 7 per cent of sole parents would like to stop working and average working hours are expected to drop by 2.5 hours.
These two components of family payments were introduced to address two separate issues.
FTB-A is meant to provide support to families on relatively low incomes whereas FTB-B is meant to provide additional support to single-income earners (including sole parents).
Therefore, sole parents are relatively worse off than before when only looking at the introduction of FTB-A. The sudden death of the payment and the higher withdrawal rates in the old January 2000 system provided disincentives for sole parent workers, which were taken away by the ANTS package. Table 4 shows that for the income tax change, the benefit withdrawal rate change and the changes to Family Tax Benefit part A, most single parents, who would like to increase their working hours, are expected to increase labour supply by 1 to 5 hours only. Further, among those who are predicted to increase their probability of working, the majority is expected to increase their working probability by less than 10 percentage points. Unlike the results for the first three components, FTB-B is expected to cause more substantial decreases in the probability of working and the predicted average working hours (possibly due to the expected move out of work instead of just a reduction in hours).
The negative effects resulting from the introduction of some components are outweighed by the positive effects of other components, such as the income tax change, which is expected to have a positive effect on all groups. The largest positive effect on labour supply is expected to be caused by the introduction of FTB-A, followed by the income tax change.
The reduction in withdrawal rate has a larger effect on the participation rate, but given the counteracting effect through workers working fewer hours the average increase in labour supply is lower. The introduction of FTB-B has a large negative effect on labour supply, caused by the replacement of a rebate, which could only be received while paying tax, by additional fortnightly payments to all sole parents. To summarise the results using the microsimulation method, they show that the full ANTS package is expected to have a positive effect on sole parents' labour supply through increased labour force participation and working hours. Examining the separate components, the income tax changes, the reduction in pension taper rate and the introduction of Family Tax Benefit part A are each predicted to have a positive effect, but the introduction of Family Tax Benefit part B is expected to have a large negative effect.
The Estimation of Policy Effects Using the Difference-inDifference Approach
This section evaluates the actual employment and labour supply change in response to the change in the Parenting Payment Single withdrawal rate and some of the relative rates of family payments, rebates and pensions. In this section a quasi-experimental evaluation approach, based on data observed before and after the policy reform, is used for the analysis. A definition of the treatment and control groups, and the parameters of interest, in addition to a general discussion of methodology and data can be found in subsection 4.1.
Subsection 4.2 describes the econometrics underlying the modelling and the final subsection discusses the estimation results.
Methodology and Data
In this ex-post evaluation, a difference-in-difference method is applied to identify the effect of this change in financial incentives for sole parents. The difference-in-difference approach identifies the treatment effect as the difference in the labour force outcome for a treatment group between post-and pre-policy change periods, minus the difference in the outcome for a control group between post-and pre-policy change periods conditional on other observed characteristics.
where denotes the outcomes for the treatment group before and after the policy change respectively; denotes the outcomes for the control group in the two periods;
and X denotes the observed characteristics.
The treatment group is defined as all sole parents with children less than 16 years of age, because they are in principle eligible for Parenting Payment Single. Although only individuals in this group with income not exceeding a certain threshold are eligible for this sole parent pension, in principle, all of them are subject to this policy change irrespective of their income. The reason for this is that income is at least partly determined by labour supply behaviour and labour supply could be affected by the reduction in withdrawal rates.
Therefore, all sole parents with children aged under 16 are potentially eligible for sole parent payments as long as they do not have a sufficient amount of income from non-labour sources rendering them ineligible for the income support payment.
We use sole parents whose youngest child is 16 or 17 years old as the control group. 11 This difference-in-difference method is based on the assumption that the treatment and control groups have similar time effects (including a cyclical effect and a general time trend) when their circumstances are the same. However, we suspect that sole parents with very young children may have a different time trend compared with the comparison group, possibly due to the different demands on the mother with regard to the required child-caring time.
Moreover, the effect of changes in childcare cost and availability over time may vary by the age of children. To avoid this problem, we restrict the treatment group sample to sole parents whose youngest child is aged 14 or 15. Since the youngest children in the households in the restricted treatment and control groups are all of secondary school age, it is likely that the time effects are similar between these two groups. It is possible to test this assumption using data from two pre-policy change periods. We discuss this in detail in Section 4.2.
Due to the sample restriction, the parameter estimated here is not the effect of treatment on the treated in general. Instead, it is the effect of treatment for those whose youngest child is aged 14 or 15. It is important to note that those with younger children are likely to have different treatment effects from the group evaluated in this section. The results from the microsimulation approach suggest that the policy effects are smaller for sole parents with children under school age.
Data from both the SIHC and the Census can potentially be used in this evaluation. The former source is better in terms of the timing of the survey whereas the latter has the 11 Other potential control groups that have been used in literature are women without dependent children and married mothers (Doiron, 2004) . We did not adopt their approach, as the labour supply elasticity is likely to be affected by the presence of dependent children, the presence of a partner and the partner's income. Therefore, these two groups are likely to have different time effects compared with the treatment group. Moreover, it is unlikely that all factors other than treatment status can be properly controlled.
advantage of a large sample size. The SIHC is available for the years 1999/2000 and 2000/2001. This covers the year before and the year after the policy changes. However, only around 60 sole parents in the restricted treatment group are part of the survey each year. Therefore, the sample is not sufficiently large to draw reliable statistical inferences.
For this reason, we use the 1996 and 2001 Census data in the main analysis. 12 The main drawback of the census data is that the pre-policy change period is four years prior to the policy change in which we are interested. However, there were no other relevant policy changes in this period that were applied differently to the treatment and control groups.
Therefore, we believe that an analysis using the 1996 and 2001 Census data is informative with regard to analysing the reduction in withdrawal rate of Parenting Payment Single, and changes to the relative rates of some income support and family payments. The summary statistics of individuals' characteristics for the Census 1996 and 2001 by treatment and control group are presented in appendix Table D1 .
Econometric modelling
The outcomes of interest include an individual's labour force participation status, employment status, full time employment status and working hours. We implement difference-in-difference estimators through two different econometric methodsconventional regression and matching methods (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000) . Both methods operate under the assumption that the time effects are the same between treatment and control group. As mentioned before, this assumption can be indirectly tested using data from two pre-policy-change periods. The idea is that if the assumption is true, we should find a zero difference-in-difference outcome in the absence of policy changes.
Unfortunately, we cannot use Census 1991 data due to the lack of household identifiers in the CURF. We therefore perform the test using the 1997/1998 and 1999/2000 SIHC data.
Due to the small sample size, the test is applied using regression only. The estimated difference-in-difference outcome is not significantly different from zero (see Appendix   table D2 ). However, these results are indicative only. It is not appropriate to draw strong conclusions based on the results from such a small sample.
For the binary outcome variables such as employment status, a probit model is applied. The explanatory variables include individuals' characteristics, a post policy period dummy, a treatment dummy and the interaction of post policy and treatment dummies (for details on explanatory variables and functional forms, see Appendix table D3 ). The policy effects are calculated using the difference-in-difference predicted probability of being in the outcome state (for example, employed) for each observation, holding all characteristics the same, but varying the group to which they belong (treatment or control group, and pre-or post-policy period). The difference-in-difference predicted effect resulting from belonging to a particular group on the probability of being in a particular outcome state is averaged across all observations.
Working hours, a continuous variable, unfortunately is only available in fairly large categories in the census data; therefore, interval regression is used in the analysis. 13 The underlying assumption is that the outcome, conditional on independent variables X, satisfies the classical linear model assumptions (Wooldridge, 2001) . However, it is not appropriate to interpret the coefficients of the post policy and treatment dummies interaction term as the treatment effect because working hours are censored at zero. To calculate the treatment effect, we first predict the working hours in the four different states (treatment and control in pre-and post-policy period) for each observation. Since negative predicted hours imply zero working hours, these are recoded to zero. Second, we calculate the difference in predicted hours between pre-and post-policy periods for the treatment and control state separately. Then the treatment effect is the change in the average difference between the two states.
The difference-in-difference method can also be applied in combination with the matching method (Blundell et al., 2001) . The intuition behind the matching difference-in-difference is to reweight the three non-treated groups (post-policy control group for the first matching, 13 The log likelihood function can be written as follows:
where is the standard cumulative normal;
denotes observations with observed point data and pre-policy treatment and control groups for the second and third matching respectively) so that they have similar observed characteristics as the treated group (sole parents with at least one child aged under 16 in the post-policy change period). The weights of non-treated groups are obtained using a matching algorithm.
To implement the matching method we use a Propensity Score Model (PSM) approach.
Essentially this involves matching treated and non-treated observations on the basis of their predicted probability of being in the treated group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . Exact matching is not feasible in this study due to the dimensionality of the set of possible combinations of observable characteristics relative to sample size. In this paper, linear predictions from a probit equation (LP) instead of the normal distribution transformed propensity score are used. The covariates used in the probit model are the same as the control variables used in the regression method. To find an appropriate functional form of the probit model for treatment participation a balancing test is used (see Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 , 2002 , and Smith and Todd, 2005 . , Y and Y p1 as the difference between the treatment and control group after the treatment and Y p2 -Y p3 as the difference between the treatment and control 14 The test was implemented by (i) dividing treated and non-treated observations into 10 groups each (to give an equal number of treatment observations in each group); (ii) performing a Hotelling test for the joint null hypothesis of equal means for all covariates between treated and non-treated groups; and (iii) adjust the number of groups or change functional form until it is not possible to reject the joint null for the Hotelling test. 15 For detailed steps of the latter two matching procedures, see Borland and Tseng (2003) . 16 A calliper is an x per cent confidence interval bandwidth around the LP for a treated observation. Here we use a 95 per cent confidence interval. group before the treatment took place. The difference between these two expressions is the predicted treatment effect for observation j. For the binomial outcome measures of employment and full-time employment, a probit model is used; and for the outcome measure of working hours, an OLS regression is applied.
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A formal mathematical description of this matching difference-in-difference estimation method is:
Where n is the number of treatment observation observations; is the indicator for treated and non-treated; is the outcome for the j , Y and Y For a matching method to be valid, two underling assumptions are required (Rubin, 1979) .
First, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which states that conditional on a set of observable variables (X), participation in treatment is unrelated to outcomes in the absence of treatment; and second the Common support assumption, which states that for each possible combination of observable variables there is a non-zero probability of nonparticipation.
Unfortunately, the CIA assumption cannot be tested due to the missing counterfactuals. The plausibility of the CIA is usually justified through the richness of the data. Although the data available in the Census are not as rich as we would like them to be, it is unlikely to be a serious problem because the treated and comparison groups are not compared directly.
Our treatment group is defined using age of youngest child, so unless the fertility rate or marriage separation rate change dramatically, it is unlikely that there are unobserved characteristics that are systematically different between groups and are correlated with the outcome. Even if such unobservables exist, as long as these are fixed over time, the effect will be differenced out.
Comparing the three matching algorithms, the nearest neighbour matching approach approximates the treated observation's counterfactual by the outcome of the closest nontreated observation. A problem could arise from the fact that the nearest neighbour of the treated observation may not be the true nearest neighbour, because the propensity score is an estimated value with a standard error attached to it. Moreover, outcomes may vary across observations with the same characteristics. The calliper matching, therefore, incorporates all outcomes of non-treated observations whose propensity scores are within the 95 per cent confidence interval of the treated observation's propensity score. Although a kernel weight is applied to take into account the distance between treated and non-treated observations' propensity scores, there is a trade-off between minimising differences and minimising the possible errors. Local linear matching is a modified version of calliper matching. The idea is to take into account the possible correlation between the propensity score and the outcome. Since it is possible that all matched non-treated observations' propensity scores are smaller (or larger) than the treated observation's propensity score, the weighted average of outcomes of the non-treated observations would be biased if outcomes are correlated with the propensity scores. If this were the case, the weighted average of outcomes would need to be adjusted. This has been addressed in the local linear matching approach.
The three different matching methods are all consistent, that is they converge to the results of exact matching (match exactly on characteristics) as the sample size grows (Smith, 2000) . However, they may provide different results in a small sample. There is no easy rule that determines which matching method is superior. In this paper, local linear matching is considered the preferred matching algorithm, because it takes into account most of the problems that could occur. However, local linear matching tends to run into problems when the sample size is small. In the separate estimation for the subsamples by age and education, calliper matching is preferred.
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Compared with traditional regression methods, the matching method has the advantage that 18 Due to the smaller size of these subsamples, some treatment observations have very few (less than 10) control observations in their matching groups (see appendix table D3 for the distribution over matching group sizes). When the number of matched control observations is small, the regression used in local linear matching to predict the counterfactual outcome of a treatment observation can be problematic and may generate unrealistic out of sample predictions.
it is a semi-parametric approach, which avoids imposing the functional form restrictions implicit in a linear regression. Smith and Todd (2005) suggest that avoiding these functional form restrictions can be important in reducing bias. Although the results of regressions could be improved by adding higher-order terms and interaction terms, this is not often done.
Another key difference between the matching and regression approach is that matching highlights the "common support" problem. This is the problem that for some treatment group observations no non-treated observation, with a close enough propensity score to be a match, can be found. 19 The matching approach produces results for those treated observations with analogues only (that is, treated observations without analogues are dropped). In the regression approach, the common support problem is ignored (Smith, 2000) . Although matching cannot solve the support problem, but only highlights it, it is still preferred because the results generated from poor matches are not meaningful. It is better to have clean but restricted results rather than results obtained by averaging over good and bad matches.
It can be difficult to deal with the support problem in the comparison of the matching difference-in-difference estimator with simple matching, because different treated observations may encounter this support problem in the three different matching approaches. Thus, different observations might be dropped in the three approaches.
Fortunately, the samples used in this paper do not suffer from this support problem. Table 5 shows the difference-in-difference estimates of policy effects in the form of changes in four different outcome measures. These are the participation rate, the employment rate, the full-time employment rate and average working hours. These effects apply only to sole parents whose youngest child is aged 14 or 15 years. The policy changes may have had different effects for sole parents with children younger than 14 years.
Results
The first row in the table is calculated from the means of the treatment and control populations. Without taking into account the differences in individuals' characteristics and just comparing the outcomes observed in the raw data, the policy change increased the participation rate by 6.3 percentage points. The employment rate and full-time employment rate were raised by 2.5 and 2.6 percentage points respectively and this translated into an increase in average working hours by 1.7 hours. The higher increase in participation rate than in employment rate implies that the change in financial incentive has increased labour supply but not all sole parents who want to move into work have found a job, in the short period of time the data allows since the change. For future study, it may be interesting to investigate longer-term policy effects, for example, 2 or years after the policy change. Abadie and Imbens (2005) shows that bootstrap is not valid for nearest neighbour matching due to its extreme non-smoothness nature. This may explain why the bootstrap standard errors for nearest neighbour matching estimates are much larger than other those for methods. 2. For the binary outcome variables, the policy changes are presented as changes in percentage points in the proportion employed, full-time employed and not in labour force. 3. See appendix D for the coefficients of the probit and interval estimation. The results of the propensity score probit model estimation are available from the authors on request.
After conditioning on individuals' characteristics, the estimates still show a positive policy effect although this is statistically insignificant, irrespective of the estimation method used.
In terms of the magnitude of the effect for a given measure, it varies across the different methods but not to a large extent, except for the participation rate when this is estimated using nearest neighbour matching. For our sample, controlling for differences in individuals' characteristics does not change the magnitude of the effects much, except for the full-time employment rate measure. The effect as measured by the change in full-time employment rate increases from 2.6 percentage points, as derived from the raw data, to 5.9
percentage points (using local linear matching) after controlling for the individuals'
characteristics. This may be due to a change in the characteristics of individuals who work full-time from the earlier to the later sample, whereas the composition of individuals in other labour force categories may have remained more stable.
20 Table 6 presents the policy effects by educational attainment and age. The results were estimated by applying the calliper difference-in-difference method separately for different target groups. The table indicates that there is heterogeneity in policy effects across the groups. The policy change has a significant positive effect on the participation rate of sole parents without post-school qualifications but a negative (insignificant) effect for those with post-school qualifications. The effect on the employment rate for the lower educational group is also fairly large, almost 9 percentage points and it is close to being significant at the 10 per cent level. However, at the same time as the decrease in the overall employment rate, the full-time employment rate for those with qualifications increased by 8.3 percentage points, which implies that more highly educated individuals shifted from part-time to full-time work after the policy changes.
Overall, sole parents without qualifications have a larger positive response to the policy changes than those with qualifications and this is reflected in the larger increase in their average working hours. This may be due to the fact that individuals without qualifications have lower incomes and are therefore more likely to be on welfare, which means the policy changes are more relevant to them. Moreover, a large proportion of those with qualifications were already in the labour force before the policy change, which makes it 20 In an alternative specification, variables are included in the propensity score probit regression to control for other household income. The income variables in the Census are measured in broad categories and therefore difficult to correct for inflation. To circumvent this problem, only a dummy when employment of children and other relatives is over 15 hours per week is included. The relative magnitude of the predicted effects on labour supply remains similar. The additional employment dummies are potentially endogenous, if sole parents' incomes would influence their children's or relatives' employment as well. This endogeneity is expected to bias the predicted labour supply effects downwards, and indeed, the labour supply responses in the alternative specification are somewhat below those presented in Table 5 . An additional variable of interest is the State of residence, but in 1996 this variable appears unreliably observed in the Census. However, our analysis includes a dummy variable distinguishing rural and urban areas. more difficult to raise the participation rate further and, in addition, the income effect resulting from the reduction in METRs may be more dominant than the substitution effect for this group. The bottom two rows of Table 6 show that the average effects are all positive for both age groups. The larger positive effects are on the full-time employment rate for younger sole parents and on the participation rate for older sole parents. For sole parents who are aged 45 or above, the effect on the participation rate is 11.1 percentage points, while the effect on the employment rate is much lower, at 6.1 percentage points. The effect on the full-time employment rate is even smaller. A possible explanation for this is that even though the policy change increases their incentive to look for work, it may be more difficult for older sole parents to get a job, since they are likely to have been out of the labour market for longer and obtaining a job can be more difficult for people over a certain age.
Comparison of the Two Approaches
In the previous section, quasi-experimental evaluation methods were used to assess the effect of the ANTS package for sole parents. This provides us with the opportunity to compare the predictions from microsimulation with an evaluation based on pre-and postreform data.
Given the comparison over time of two similar groups where the members in principle only differ with regard to their eligibility for Parenting Payment Single, the differences between these two groups reflect only the reduction of the pension withdrawal rate and differences between the relative changes in income support payments and family payments for children under 16 and for children 16 years of age or over. To focus on the effects, as predicted by MITTS, for the subgroup of sole parents with children of 14 and 15 years old, Table 7 presents the results from MITTS for this subgroup using with older children is clearly higher as well.
In addition, simulation of some components of the ANTS package was done separately.
First, the effect of the decrease in pension rate is examined in isolation, given that this was relevant for the treatment group but not for the control group in the previous section. The effect of this is much smaller than the effect of the full package.
It is difficult to do the exact simulation that would represent the same change as measured by the evaluation study, given that for both the control and treatment group, family payments are likely to have changed, but to a different extent, as have the relative levels of the different income support payments. Therefore, we also looked at the effect of all changes except for the income tax changes. 21 This effect is still much smaller than the overall change and no longer significant. The true policy effect measured by the evaluation is in between the decrease in pension rate alone and the effect of all changes minus the income tax change. However, the true effect may be larger than the results in the last two columns of Table 7 , because some of the family payment changes had a large negative impact on labour supply. (-0.73, 0.25) (0.04, 0.45) (-2.11, -0.61) Note ( Table 7 . It is clear that the overall effect for this group is much smaller than for the group of sole parents with younger children (and no longer significant for the forward simulation and only just significant for the backward simulation).
The effect is slightly negative, whereas the pre-reform level of labour force participation is higher.
For each of the simulations, we can calculate the same measures as used in the evaluation approaches, except for the separate labour force participation. Table 8 are very close to the results from local linear matching, except that a lower probability of full-time employment and a higher probability of part-time employment are predicted. The latter might be due to a limited number of part-time jobs being available; that is, even if some sole parents prefer a part-time job they may not be able to find one and decide not to participate in the labour force or work full-time. Table 8 shows that the results from the simulation and evaluation approaches are in the same direction and if anything, the results from microsimulation appear to be on the conservative side. A concern with behavioural microsimulation is usual that it may overestimate the actual effect. Similar conclusions were drawn by Doiron (2004) . When she compared the results from her evaluation study of the late 1980s changes to payments for sole parents to the effects of comparable (but not the same) changes to the tax and transfer system, as published in Duncan and Harris (2002) and Creedy, Kalb and Kew (2003) , she found that the evaluation seemed to estimate similar but somewhat larger effects than obtained from behavioural microsimulation for comparable hypothetical policy changes.
Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to compare the predicted effects of a recent policy change on labour supply using two different approaches. For a subgroup of sole parents, the results from a quasi-experimental evaluation study were compared with simulation results. We found both from behavioural microsimulation and from a difference-in-difference matching evaluation, that a reduced pension withdrawal rate and changed family payments had resulted in a considerable increase in employment, and in full-time employment in particular, indicating that some of the part-time workers seemed to be motivated by the reforms to change their labour supply preference to full-time employment.
The effects found are not large, but the combined policy changes seem to have had modest positive effects on labour supply. Some significant effects were found when the sample was separated by age of the mother or education level of the mother. In addition, the point estimates for the effects on average hours, probability of employment and the probability of full-time employment (in particular, when using the most rigorous approach of local linear matching) are remarkably close to the results found for the same subgroup of sole parents through microsimulation using MITTS. The quasi-experimental evaluation approach resulted in slightly larger effects than the effects predicted by MITTS except for the results on the probability of part-time employment, which was higher in the simulation. The latter might be due to the relatively low number of part-time jobs available.
Encouraged by the comparable outcomes using the two different approaches, we can use the microsimulation approach to evaluate the full policy change for all sole parents and break down the result into effects caused by separate components of the overall reform. The microsimulation results indicate that there is a small positive effect of the full policy change on sole parents' labour supply. Comparing the effects of separate components of the ANTS reform, we find that the change in Family Tax Benefit part A had a relatively large positive impact on sole parents' labour supply, confirming the observation by Gregory, Klug and Thapa (2003) that almost all income and work incentive changes flowed from the changed withdrawal rates and base rate of Family Tax Benefit part A. However, at the same time the changes to Family Tax Benefit part B had a large negative effect on the labour supply of sole parents. The negative effect for sole parents is likely to have been caused by the replacement of a rebate, which could only be received while paying tax (for which most sole parents would need to be employed), by additional fortnightly payments to all sole parents. As a result being out of the labour force has become more attractive.
The reduction in the withdrawal rate of the Parenting Payment Single and the reduced income tax rates and increased tax thresholds both had a positive effect on sole parents' labour supply. The reduced withdrawal rate of the Parenting Payment Single had a relatively large effect on the labour force participation decision, whereas the income tax changes seemed to induce sole parents, who were already in work, to work more hours.
To recap briefly, for a subgroup of sole parents this paper has made a meaningful comparison between results using two different approaches and different data. Note: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. a) Although in principle a Tobit regression should be used for the hours of work regression, the small number of observations makes this not so relevant. -20  11  0  2  0  0  0  21-50  31  0  13  0  3  0  51-100  75  10  110  2  29  4  101-200  192  47  184  36  220  180  201-300  0  252  0  214  0  68  Total  309  309  309  252  252  252 
